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Abstract
We examine gender differences in career progression and promotions in central banking, 
a stereotypical male-dominated occupation, using confi dential anonymized personnel 
data from the European Central Bank (ECB) during the period 2003-2017. A wage gap 
emerges between men and women within a few years of hiring, despite broadly similar entry 
conditions in terms of salary levels and other observables. We also fi nd that women are less 
likely to be promoted to a higher salary band up until 2010 when the ECB issued a public 
statement supporting diversity and took several measures to support gender balance. 
Following this change, the promotion gap disappears. The gender promotion gap prior to 
this policy change is partly driven by the presence of children. Using 2012-2017 data on 
promotion applications and decisions, we explore the promotion process in depth, and 
confi rm that during this most recent period women are as likely to be promoted as men. This 
results from a lower probability of women to apply for promotion, combined with a higher 
probability of women to be selected conditional on having applied. Following promotion, 
women perform better in terms of salary progression, suggesting that the higher probability 
to be selected is based on merit, not positive discrimination.
Keywords: gender gaps, working histories, promotions, central banking.
JEL classifi cation: J16, J31, J41, J63.
Resumen
Este trabajo estudia diferencias de género en la carrera profesional y en las promociones en 
la banca central, una ocupación predominantemente masculina. Empleamos datos 
confi denciales anónimos del personal del Banco Central Europeo (BCE) durante el período 
2003-2017. Documentamos que surge una brecha salarial entre hombres y mujeres a los 
pocos años tras su contratación, a pesar de condiciones de ingreso similares en términos 
de niveles salariales y en otros observables. También encontramos que la probabilidad de 
promoción a una banda salarial superior era menor para las mujeres hasta 2010, cuando el 
BCE emitió una declaración pública en apoyo a la diversidad y tomó varias medidas para 
apoyar la igualdad de género. Tras este cambio, la brecha de promoción desaparece. La 
brecha de promoción de género previa al cambio de política se debía, en parte, al efecto 
de la maternidad sobre la carrera profesional de las madres. Con datos de aplicaciones 
y decisiones en procesos de ascensos de 2012 a 2017, exploramos el proceso de promoción 
en profundidad y confi rmamos que, durante este período más reciente, las mujeres tienen la 
misma probabilidad de promoción que los hombres. Sin embargo, esta ausencia de brecha 
enmascara dos efectos opuestos: una menor probabilidad de que las mujeres soliciten 
participar en los procesos de promoción y una mayor probabilidad de que las mujeres sean 
seleccionadas condicionado a  ser candidatas. Después de obtener la promoción, las mujeres 
muestran una mejor progresión salarial que los hombres ascendidos, lo que sugiere que 
la mayor probabilidad de ser seleccionado se debe a mérito y no a discriminación positiva.
Palabras clave: brechas de género, vidas laborales, promociones, banca central.
Códigos JEL: J16, J31, J41, J63.
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1See https://www.ft.com/content/ and https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/.
2See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/decisions/genc/html/index.en.html. The General Council
consists of the President of the ECB, the Vice-President of the ECB, and the governors of the national
central banks of the 28 EU Member States.
1 Introduction
Economics remains a male-dominated field. In the US, women account for 28.8 percent
of PhD graduates but only a mere 13.9 percent of full professors in economics (CSWEP
2017). This under-representation of women is perhaps nowhere as visible as in central
banks (Carney 2017; OMFIF 2019).1 For instance, only one woman holds a seat on the
30-member General Council of the European Central Bank (ECB).2
Several explanations may account for the lack of women in high-level positions of the
economics profession. One possibility is that the pool of potential applicants is male-
dominated. Despite recent efforts to turn the tide, women remain less prone to study
economics, and macroeconomics in particular (Ginther and Kahn 2004). An alternative
explanation is that women are less likely to apply for promotions because of gender dif-
ferences in the preference for competitive environments (Niederle and Versterlund 2007)
or in bargaining abilities in the labour market (Blackaby et al. 2005), or more generally
that “women don’t ask” (Babcock and Laschever 2003). The presence of children and
trade-offs between family and career may also hold back women from pursuing promo-
tions (Bertrand 2013; Bertrand et al. 2015). Apart from these supply-side explanations,
a third explanation is gender-based discrimination in promotion decisions. For instance,
Goldin and Rouse (2000) find that women are more likely to be selected when the identity
of candidates is being concealed.
Which of these explanations is more relevant? And can corporate diversity policies
mitigate these biases? Despite a large body of literature on gender differences, there is no
agreement on the importance of diversity policies and their impact on labour market out-
comes. Many studies on the effects of diversity are based on cross-sectional comparisons,
making it difficult to infer causality. And most studies rely on survey data across differ-
ent firms or institutions and are therefore prone to selection bias and omitted variable
bias. Moreover existing studies on corporate diversity policies have primarily focused on
the impact of gender quotas at corporate board level, not policies that affect employees
throughout the organization. A key open question is whether such policies improve labour
market outcomes for women.
In this paper, we analyze the career progression of men and women at the ECB, one
of the major central banks in the world, using confidential data from its personnel records
and selection campaigns. This provides a unique setting to study alternative explanations
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for the differences in career choices and progression between men and women. Given
the influence central banks wield over the economic well-being of the public at large, a
better understanding of the factors that hold back women at these institutions is of vital
importance.
We make three contributions to the literature. First, we are the first to exploit the
complete personnel records of a large organization to analyze gender bias in career pro-
gression and promotion decisions. This allows a more comprehensive analysis of career
progression across various job levels within an organization, in contrast to much of the
literature that focuses on gender differences at corporate board or leadership levels.
Second, in contrast to much of the literature on promotion decisions, we simultaneously
consider the role of promotion applications and decisions when identifying the drivers of
the promotion gap. Analyzing promotion decisions without accounting for gender gaps in
applications would bias the results. We are able to do so because we have information on
both promotion applications and decisions, while existing literature has focused on only
one of these dimensions.
Third, in 2010 the ECB issued a public statement supporting diversity and took several
measures to support gender balance throughout its organization. Our dataset allows us
to exploit this change to assess the impact of corporate diversity policies on promotion
outcomes. While the economics literature has assessed the impact of gender quotas for
corporate board seats on corporate decisions, to our knowledge we are the first to consider
the impact of broad-based corporate diversity policies on female labour market outcomes.
Using personnel records comes with several data advantages. By focusing on differ-
ences within the same organization, we abstract from any unobserved differences across
institutions or industries that each may display their unique biases. Another advantage is
that we avoid any measurement error associated with survey data. Moreover these records
cover the complete population of employees, including all potential internal applicants,
thus mitigating the usual selection bias that hamper many existing studies.
Our findings are as follows. First, we show that a wage gap emerges between men
and women within a few years of hiring, despite roughly similar initial conditions in
terms of salary levels and other observables. This wage gap grows steadily with tenure.
One important driver of this wage differential is the presence of children, consistent with
previous literature. Second, we find that women are less likely to be promoted to a
higher salary band prior to the change in corporate diversity policy in 2010, while this
promotion gap disappears following this change. Third, using detailed data on selection
campaigns available since 2012, we examine the selection process for promotions and find
that women are less likely to apply for promotion opportunities, even when they hold
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the same qualifications and work experience as men. Moreover we confirm that during
this period women are as likely to be promoted as men. This points to a compositional
effect whereby women conditional on applying are more likely to be promoted, other
things equal. Following promotion, women perform better in terms of salary progression,
suggesting that the higher probability to be selected is based on merit instead of positive
discrimination. We do not find evidence that the composition of the selection committee,
including the fraction of women on the panel, alters these results. Taken together, these
results point to the effectiveness of corporate diversity policies in reducing gender bias in
promotions and lend support to supply-side explanations for the existence of remaining
gender differences in promotion outcomes. Consistent with this, we find that women are
more likely to apply when they are supported by a mentor.
Our paper relates to a growing literature on gender gaps. Much of this literature has
focused on measuring the wage gap between men and women, and seeking explanations for
this gap. These explanations range from differences in abilities and preferences over jobs
(e.g., Polacheck 1981, Azmat and Ferrer 2017) to (individual or universal) discrimination
(e.g. Goldin and Rouse 2000). Women tend to be more risk averse and less competitive,
with women performing more poorly in competitive environments and shying away from
such competitive environments (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007, Buser et al. 2014, Brands
and Fernandez-Mateo 2017), while men tend to be over-confident (Barber and Odean
2001, Bordalo et al. 2016). In terms of biases from social norms and discrimination,
there is evidence that following deregulation of banking markets the wage premium of
men decreased and the proportion of women in managerial positions increased (Black
and Strahan 2001), that both men and women rate male job applicants higher for jobs
that require math skills (Moss-Racusin et al. 2012, Reuben et al. 2014), that legislation
that increases pay transparency reduces the gender pay gap (Bennedsen et al. 2018), and
that women are more severly punished for financial misconduct (Egan, Matvos, and Seru
2017).
Career-family balance considerations and the presence of children also play an im-
portant role, with a close link between career interruptions and earnings growth (Lazear
and Rosen 1990). Women remain dominant providers of child care within the household,
while many of higher-paying jobs have long hours and inflexible schedules, and many of
the financially more rewarding careers require no job interruptions to stay on the “fast
track” (Goldin 2014). Career interruptions and weekly hours worked have been found to
be key factors driving the gender pay gap, with the presence of children being a main
contributor to this (Bertrand et al. 2010). Women tend to find it difficult to double up
between work and family, with those combining family with a career reporting to be more
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unhappy, sad, stressed and tired compared to those staying at home (Bertrand 2013).
Differences in educational attainment are no longer an important driver with the fraction
of female college graduates having caught up to the levels of men (Goldin et al. 2006).
Promotion applications and decisions have been less studied and have focused pri-
marily on academia, arguably because of data availability and academic interest. For
instance, Ginther and Hayes (1999) using data from the Survey of Doctoral Recipients
from the National Science Foundation find that it takes women much longer to obtain
tenure, while Ginther and Kahn (2004) find using the same survey that this is especially
true in the field of economics when compared to other fields in social sciences or the hu-
manities. Gender differences in productivity, the effect of children, and other observables
can only partly explain the promotion gap. Blackaby et al. (2005) provide survey-based
evidence for the UK that female academic economists are less likely to be promoted in part
because they receive less outside offers, while Bosquet et al. (2018) analyze the national
promotion system of French academic economists and show that women are less likely
to enter promotion contests. An exception is Azmat and Ferrer (2017) who analyze the
performance and career progression of lawyers using survey data of US law firms. They
find that male lawyers perform better in terms of hours billed and new client revenue
and that this enhances their subsequent promotion prospects. Our finding that salaries
progress faster for women following promotion is reminiscent of the work by Card et al.
(2018) who find that conditional on publication in a top academic journal, women have
higher citations, implying that the bar for promotion is higher for women.
The role of mentoring in promotions has been primarily studied in the management and
psychology literature. Mentoring has been found to positively influence the chance of a
promotion (Hunt and Michael 1983, Dreher and Ash 1990), and there is some evidence that
this may be particularly important for women, both in overcoming organizational barriers
and in serving as role models (Noe 1988). Recent experience with mentoring programs
for assistant professors in economics also point to preliminary benefits in publication and
grant application outcomes (Blau et al. 2010). However, unlike us, none of these studies
consider career progression or promotions directly.
The impact of corporate diversity policies on labour market outcomes has been less
studied and has primarily focused on the impact of gender quotas for corporate board
seats. Evidence of the success of such policies is mixed. For instance, Bertrand et al.
(2018) show that while the gender gap in earnings within boards fell following the estab-
lishment of such quotas in Norway, there was no such effect on the salaries of similarly
qualified women who were not appointed to boards. Moreover, Ahern and Dittmar (2012)
find that the Norwegian quota led to less experienced boards, prompting declines in firm
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3All data have been anonymized by the ECB’s Human Resources (HR) directorate. No individual
information can be identified by the authors.
valuation and performance, while Matsa and Miller (2013) find that the quota prompted
changes in corporate decisions, with affected firms increasing salaries and employment lev-
els. More generally, Matsa and Miller (2011) find that the share of women on corporate
boards directly influences the share of female executives.
Other related work has studied the impact of gender composition of selection com-
mittees on the promotion gap. For instance, Bagues et al. (2017) analyze data from
the Italian and Spanish national academic appointment systems and do not find evi-
dence that a larger number of women on the evaluation committee enhances outcomes
for female candidates. Moreover, male committee members become less favorable toward
female candidates when women are on the committee, consistent with theories that the
entry of women can contribute to strengthen male identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2000).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting. Section 3
describes the dataset. Section 4 presents results on gender differences in pay, and section
5 presents results on gender differences in promotions, including the impact of the 2010
change in corporate diversity policy. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional background
Our analysis is based on the personnel files of the ECB.3 The ECB is the central bank
for the 19 member states of the euro area and was established in 1998. Together with
the 19 national central banks in the euro area it is responsible for price stability and the
supervision of banks in the euro area. The ECB’s workforce consists of over 2,500 staff
and is drawn from the 28 European Union (EU) member states.
The ECB is an expert-based organization. Experts join at different salary bands,
depending on their level of education and previous work experience.4 Because the ECB is
a relatively young organization and offers competitive salaries and benefits, its attrition
rate is relatively low (at about 0.8%). The ECB, similar to other major banks, has a
substantial gender imbalance, especially at managerial levels and among economist staff.
At end-2017, women accounted for 39.6% of staff at expert level, but 17.1% of senior
managers.
Salaries are paid according to different salary bands, and salaries within each band
increase in steps, such that each step is 0.25% higher than the previous one. Salary
increases are the outcome of performance reviews. Salaries are reviewed annually based
4See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/careers/what-we-offer/benefits/html/index.en.html for the mini-
mum (after tax) salary table.
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on each staff member’s personal development and contribution to the performance of the
organization. According to this, each staff member is granted a number of steps, ranging
from 0 to 14. Career progression within a salary band is granted after performance
reviews, while promotions to the next salary band require winning a selection campaign.
Promotions and hiring follow upon formal selection campaigns. A selection campaign
consists of several stages, including job posting, job application, interviewing, shortlisting
and selection. Applicants for openings at a certain salary band typically include a mix
of candidates that already operate at this salary band elsewhere in the organization (i.e.,
lateral move) and candidates that operate at one salary band below the job opening (i.e.,
promotion), together with external candidates. Candidates at salary bands more than
one level away from the posted band are rarely invited for an interview.
Selections follow an interview, often complemented with written exercises or other
assessments. The selection committee typically consists of representatives of the hiring
business area, the HR directorate, and another business area, who operate at levels above
or at the same level as the advertized position. Following the interview, the selection
committee agrees on a ranking of candidates, drawing up a short list of eligible candidates,
and offers the position to the highest ranked candidate.
Our analysis focuses on expert staff across salary bands F/G, H and I. The typical job
titles for these jobs include economist for salary band F, senior economist for salary band
G, principal economist for salary band H, and adviser for salary band I. The minimum
education requirement for salary band F/G and above is a master’s degree. Salary band
H is the highest salary band below managerial levels (that span salary bands I through L).
The entry level for PhD economists is salary band F/G. Salary band F/G consists of two
bands–F and G– and progression from salary band F to G is based on performance and
does not require a promotion decision. It generally takes at least seven years for someone
entering salary band F to reach salary band H, comparable to the time it takes to reach
tenure decisions in academia. Salary band I combines both senior experts at adviser level
and the first level of management, i.e., unit chiefs or deputy heads of division. Job profiles
below salary band F include analysts (salary band E) and assistants and other support
staff (salary bands A through D).
The analysis is limited to the policy departments, the research department and the
statistics department to ensure comparability across individuals.5 This part of the ECB
workforce is comparable in terms of educational attainment and academic publication
5Specifically the departments included in the analysis include Economics, Monetary Policy, Market
Operations, Market Infrastructure, International, Financial Stability, Risk Management, Research, and
Statistics. Remaining departments include the service areas, banknotes, banking supervision and the
legal department.
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record to economists at the U.S. Federal Reserve and major universities.6 Within these
departments, most staff hold a degree in economics, finance or statistics. The majority of
staff who enter through bands F/G has no prior work experience, entering straight from
university. The result is a relatively homogeneous workforce, facilitating the identification
of gender effects.
Since 2010, the ECB has made a fundamental shift regarding gender diversity, taking
several steps to raise the awareness of the importance of gender diversity and to enhance
the diversity of its workforce. This shift in corporate policy is a key aspect of our analysis.
In late 2010, the ECB’s Executive Board announced this policy shift by issuing a public
statement on diversity indicating that the ECB aims to be a workplace where staff mem-
bers feel included and respected, and where their individual talents are valued, developed
and rewarded. The public statement reads as follows: “Diversity is a key contributor to
our success. As a European Union institution, the ECB aspires to be an organization in
which diversity is welcomed and appreciated in all its facets for the richness that it offers.
The facets of diversity include – but are not limited to – gender, nationality, religion,
sexual orientation, ethnic origin, age, cultural background and disability”. While the
statement refers to diversity and inclusion in a broad sense, most of the diversity action
plan centers around gender diversity.
Subsequently, the ECB launched a diversity action plan consisting of several measures
6For instance, according to RePEc rankings, the ECB has a similar number of authors as the
US Federal Reserve Board and the ranking of its research output is similar to that of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; see
https://ideas.repec.org/top/top.central.html.
that have been implemented over subsequent years. These measures span four broad areas:
1) Attracting female candidates; 2) Enhancing the internal pipeline of female candidates;
3) Facilitating work-life balance; and 4) Increasing accountability and commitment.
A key element of the diversity action plan has been the setting of gender targets for
managerial positions. These targets, announced on June 4, 2013, are to be reached by
year-end 2019. The targets are 35% of women in management positions (salary bands
I-L) and 28% of women in senior management positions (salary bands K-L).
Another key focus of the diversity action plan has been to enhance the representation
of women on selection panels, with the aim to reduce possible gender-biased biases or
discrimination in promotion decisions. On March 18, 2013, the ECB amended its staff
rules to introduce more flexibility in the selection of selection committee members by
allowing the inclusion of one member from another business area if this enhances the
gender diversity of the selection committee. Effectively, following this change most se-
lection panels consisted of at least one female member. In addition, from that point on
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HR implemented a practice of ensuring at least two female panel members on selection
committees for positions at the H-band level.
Finally, the diversity action plan also included a mentoring program, starting with a
pilot in 2012 that was subsequently formalized in December 2014. Mentors are experienced
staff members that are committed to providing support to more junior employees with
a view to enhance their career development and upward mobility in the organization.
Mentors can be both male and female, and participation in the program takes place on a
voluntary basis. While the program is focused on women, with a view to achieve gender
targets at managerial positions, it is also open to men. In practice, most of the mentees
are women. A key focus of this mentorship program is to help women to overcome any
social or cultural biases that slows down their career progression.
3 Data
The two datasets that we use in this paper are derived from the personnel records of the
ECB and cover the period up to 2017. The information was provided on an anonymous
basis and transformed in such a way that while individuals cannot be identified, much of
the relevant information is preserved.
Sample Our analysis focuses on expert staff across four different salary bands (F, G,
H, and I) in the policy areas, the research department and the statistics department,
because these are business areas across which we observe considerable flows of staff over
time. With this selected group we focus on a broadly homogeneous pool of staff in terms
of human capital and experience, ensuring comparability across individuals.
Dataset 1: Working histories 2003-2017 The first dataset includes demographic
characteristics and working histories of the employees over the period 2003 to 2017. We
build a unique panel where the unit of analysis is the employee by month and year since
entry to the ECB. Our salary measure is the number of salary steps, such that the first step
of band A equals 1 and the variable continues as consecutive natural numbers, as reported
in Table 1.7 In practice, each number of steps corresponds to a salary level in euros. These
salary steps are a measure of the base salary, excluding bonuses or allowances.
We focus the analysis on the period 2003 to 2017, as coherent information on salaries is
available only since 2003. However, we have complete historical information to construct
the work histories (for instance, tenure in the band and total experience) for each employee
since entry into the ECB, going back all the way to the establishment of the ECB in 1998.
7The steps for our sample (F/G to I) go from 263 to 544.
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Our panel consists of 1,084 workers and 85,516 monthly observations in total. From those
records we can compute tenure, whether the employee has moved either department or
business area, her salary band, etc. This enables us to explore the existence and potential
drivers of gender pay gaps over the workers career. We also use this dataset to examine
the probability of moving to a higher band (promotion) over the time span 2003 to 2017,
and to assess whether the diversity policy changes have had any material effect on the
gender promotion gap over this period.
Dataset 2: Recruitment campaigns 2012-2017 Our second dataset consists of
information on each recruitment campaign that has taken place since 2012. For each
campaign we have detailed information on every internal potential candidate, limited
information on external candidates, information on recruitment panel composition and
information on the position itself, namely salary band and business area.
Combining both datasets we can determine every potential internal candidate for each
particular campaign. Given that we are interested in promotions from salary band F/G
to salary band H, we exclude horizontal moves within the same salary band and use infor-
mation from 61 promotion campaigns in total. In this sample of candidates and potential
candidates per campaign, we can compute monthly probabilities of seeking a promotion,
getting a promotion, whether the employee has applied previously for a promotion, how
many times the employee has applied for a promotion, etc. This information allows us
to explore in depth the promotion process from 2012, distinguishing between applications
and promotion decisions.
3.1 Variable definitions
Based on these two datasets, we construct a number of variables for the empirical analysis.
FEMALE is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the employee is a woman and
zero otherwise. TENURE WITHIN BAND is the number of years that the employee
has been in the current salary band. SALARY BAND H (I) is a dummy variable that
takes a value of one if the employee is currently in salary band H (I), and zero otherwise.
AGE is the age of the employee in intervals of 5 years. In the regressions, we include age
dummies for each bracket. SALARY STEPS indicates the salary level, in steps, of the
employee. CHILDREN is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the employee has
dependent children, and zero otherwise. We also construct variables based on the number
of children. TEMPORARY PROMOTION is a dummy variable that takes a value of one
if the employee has had a temporary promotion to the level of the open position, and zero
otherwise. Temporary promotions are different from permanent promotions because they
( )
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are temporary (typically lasting a few months to one year) and do not follow a formal
campaign. The focus in our analysis is on permanent promotions. TOP PERFORMER
is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the employee’s salary award is among the
top 25% of the salary increases in her business area at least once in the past two years,
and zero otherwise. In addition to a salary award, high performing individuals can also
receive a one-off cash bonus equivalent to up to 5% of annual salary. Bonuses are awarded
to only a small fraction of individuals each year and because they do not alter salary
levels have a small effect on life time earnings. BONUS is a dummy variable that takes
a value of one if the employee received cash bonuses at least once in the past two years,
and zero otherwise. Since 2012, employees can participate in a mentorship program, with
the view to enhance their career progression. Most mentees are women. MENTEE takes
a value of one if the employee participated in the mentorship program at east once in the
past two years, and zero otherwise. Employees can also work part time. PART-TIME
is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the employee has worked part-time in
the last two years, and zero otherwise. The ECB offers maternity leave of 20 weeks per
child to women. MATERNITY LEAVE is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the
employee has taken maternity leave in the last two years, and zero otherwise. Employees
receive a head of household allowance if they have a spouse with a gross annual income
below a certain level (currently e 57,211) or if they do not have a spouse but one or
more dependent children. HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD takes a value of one if the employee
is the head of household, and zero otherwise. We know whether applicants are internal
or external but otherwise have limited information on external candidates. SHARE OF
EXTERNAL CANDIDATES is the ratio of external candidates to total candidates that
have applied to a particular selection campaign. SIZE OF SELECTION PANEL is the
number of panel members on the selection panel. SHARE OF FEMALE PANELISTS is
the number of female panel members divided by the total number of panel members.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics of our main variables can be found in Table 2. The data cover
1,084 employees over the period 2003 to 2017, for a total of 85,516 observations. As in
other economics professions, women are underrepresented, totaling 31.6% of all employees.
Moreover, the number of women decreases at higher salary bands, from 31.6% in salary
band F/G to 24.2% in salary band H and 16.8% in salary band I, pointing to a leaky
pipeline in women’s career progression. Men tend to be slightly older on average at 40
years, compared to 39 years for women, and salary levels tend to be somewhat higher for
men, 381 steps for men against 357 steps for women.
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The summary statistics also indicate that women are less likely to be promoted prior
to 2011, with only 0.22% of women in the sample receiving a permanent promotion as
opposed to 0.49% for men. However, after 2011, following the changes in corporate
diversity policies, this difference disappears.
The bottom panel of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the campaigns dataset.
This dataset covers 810 applicants and 61 promotions for a total of 23,259 potential
applicant observations. The share of external candidates per campaign averages 10.4%
and the share of female panelists per campaign averages 41.1%. Female applicants tend
to have been longer in their salary band prior to applying for a promotion, for a total
of 8.2 years as opposed to 7.2 years for men. Conditional on applying, women are more
likely to win the campaign than men, with a probability of winning of 12.1% for women
compared to 5.8% for men. Female applicants tend to have more experience (i.e., longer
tenure within the band), are more likely to have been top performers, and more likely to
have children.
Selection bias is a common problem in many studies that compare the career progres-
sion of men and women. For instance, differences in prior work experience between men
and women could introduce a bias. One advantage of our setting is that we have a highly
homogenous workforce of economists that typically join the ECB straight out of graduate
school without prior work experience, resulting in a sample of men and women with simi-
lar characteristics when they enter. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of both men and
women upon entry at salary level F/G, broken down by three different subperiods. We
limit the sample here to the initial observations of employees that enter at salary band
F/G (entry level). Our main variables of interest show no material differences between
newly hired men and women at entry level, allaying concerns about selection bias in our
sample. Male employees at entry are slightly older and are somewhat more likely to have
children than females but these differences are small and not significant throughout the
sample period. Most new employees enter at young age with graduate degrees and com-
parable salaries. Salary offers at the ECB for incoming staff are largely determined based
on the number of years of schooling and work experience. While we do not have informa-
tion on prior work experience, the data therefore suggests that most new employees have
no prior work experience and that there are no material differences between prior work
experience between men and women in our sample.
Attrition bias is also not a problem in our sample given the very low attrition rate of
0.4% in our sample. This low attrition rate is a result of the relatively young workforce
at the ECB and its competitive benefits.
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4 Gender wage gap over the career
In this section, we analyze the gender wage gap for professional staff over time. Salaries
at the ECB are paid according to different salary bands and increase in steps. In this
setting, salary steps are a good measure of career progression, both within the band and
across bands. Progressing to the next band requires winning a promotion campaign.
The left-side panel of Figure 1 shows raw salary profiles by gender since entry in
salary band F/G, the entry level for professional staff. The initial wage gender gap is
small, as one would expect, given the similar initial conditions in terms of human capital
and experience between men and women in our sample. This wage gap however increases
over time, as the career of the individuals progresses: the initial average wage gender
gap of 5 salary steps (1.25%), increases up to 8 steps in just 1 year, to 25 steps in 5
years, and becomes almost 6 times bigger (30 steps or 7.25%) on average after 10 years.
Interestingly, we also observe that wage gender gaps are much smaller for workers who
stay in the same salary band (see right-side panel of Figure 1): 5 salary steps at entry,
6 steps after 1 year, 8 steps after 5 years, and 10 steps (about 2%) after 10 years. This
suggests that promotions are potentially responsible for the career gender gap. Indeed,
on average, the wage gender gap is 7% in favor of men for the whole sample, while it is
1.8% for those workers who stay within the same salary band.
Another usual suspect of driving the gender wage gap, namely having children, also
appears to play a role according to the raw data. Figure 2 shows a narrower gender salary
gap among workers without children than among those who have children.
4.1 Wage model
To account for individual features and other potential factors shaping gender wage gaps,
we estimate a linear regression model for the log salary steps Sit of worker i at time t:
Sit = α
S + βSFemalei +X
′
itγ
S + δSt + 
S
it (1)
where the dummy Female is equal to 1 for women, the vector Xit includes individual and
job characteristics, such as age, directorate, salary band, tenure in the band, and family
structure, δt are time dummies (year and month), and 
S
it is a random error term with
unrestricted correlation at the individual level. Model (1) is estimated by OLS, and βS
is our coefficient of interest.8
8We do not include individual fixed effects in these regressions because we are interested in estimating
the effect of Female. As shown in Table A.1, including individual fixed effects does not add much
explanatory power and does not qualitatively alter the estimated coefficients on other covariates. We will
be including individual fixed effects when we analyze differential effects in promotion outcomes in the
next section.
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Regression results are shown in Table 4. All regressions include directorate and time
dummies. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
According to Table 4, once we control for time dummies and observable characteristics
of the workers (such as directorate, salary band, tenure in that band and age), we move
from an unconditional gap of 7% to a conditional gender gap of 1.1% - 1.3%, similar to
the conditional gap within the same salary band (1.5%). Indeed, if we omit the salary
band variables from the regression (columns (3) and (4)), the estimated β increases to
3.6-6.4%, pointing to the importance of changing band (i.e., promotions) for the analysis.
Promotions are precisely what we explore in the next section. We also find that those
with a longer tenure in the band have higher salaries.
Thus far we have not considered the role of children. Children are commonly found
to be a key driver of wage gaps. We therefore expand the regression with the inclusion
of controls for the number and age of children. These results are reported in Table A.2.
We find that the estimated coefficient for the Female variable hardly varies when adding
controls for the number and age of children.
Next we split our sample between workers with and without children. The results
are presented in Table 5. We now find that the overall gender wage gap is larger among
workers with children (1.6%) whereas it is small and statistically insignificant for those
workers without children (0.07%). Also, within the same salary band, the conditional
gender gap for workers with children is more than double the gap for those without.
5 Gender differences in promotions
In this section we document gender differences in promotions using two complementary
datasets: data on working histories and data on recruitment campaigns.
The first dataset allows defining promotion as a movement from band F/G to band
H or I. The advantage of this dataset is that it covers all employees over the period 2003
to 2017, thus allowing to explore whether there have been any changes over time in the
probability of men and women to be promoted. Moreover, this dataset can be used to test
whether the corporate policies triggered by the 2010 public statement on diversity may
have caused a change in the promotion gap. The disadvantage of this dataset on working
histories is that it does not contain information on recruiting campaigns and therefore
cannot be used to explore the promotion process in detail. In this dataset we only observe
promotion outcomes, i.e., movements to a higher wage band.
The second dataset on recruitment campaigns has the advantage of offering detailed
information on promotion applicants. This dataset, when combined with data on working
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histories, enables defining the set of potential candidates for each recruitment campaign
and therefore allows to analyze the promotion process in more detail. The shortcoming
of this second dataset, however, is that it is available only starting in 2012.
5.1 Probability of promotion: information on working histories
(2003-2017)
The average monthly probability of promotion, defined in our sample of working histories
as moving from band F/G to band H or I, is 0.004 between 2003 and 2017. This amounts
to a promotion probability of 4.8% in annual terms, or about 48% after 10 years. Figure 3
shows that this unconditional probability of promotion is lower for women than for men.
After 10 years, about 50 percent of men have been promoted to at least salary band H
while the same is true for only 30 percent of women.
To control for employee heterogeneity and assess the drivers of this gender promotion
gap, we estimate the following linear model for the probability that a given worker i moves
from salary band F/G at time t to salary bands H or I at time t+ 1:
Pit = α
P + βPFemalei + Z
′
itγ
P + δPt + 
P
it (2)
where, as before, the dummy Female is equal to 1 for women, Zit is a vector of individual
(either personal and family characteristics) and job (such as job characteristics and worker
productivity measures) features, δPt are time fixed effects, and 
P
it is a random error term
with unrestricted correlation at the individual level. Model (2) is estimated among staff
in band F/G until the moment of the individual’s promotion, and βP is our coefficient of
interest.
Regression results are shown in Table 6. All the regressions include directorate, time
and age dummies. As before, robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
We find that, on average for the whole sample, the estimate of βP is negative and
significant (columns (1) and (2) of Table 6). The probability of promotion for women
is substantially lower than for men, with a gap of 0.18%, or about 45% of the average
probability of promotion of 0.4%. Moreover, the gap is larger for workers with children
(more than half of the average) and turns insignificant when limiting the sample to the
pool of workers without children (columns (4) and (3), respectively). We also find that
employees that have recently been top performers or have received bonuses, proxying
for performance, are more likely to be promoted. Having joined the ECB’s mentoring
program, however, does not appear to influence the probability of promotion.
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5.1.1 Impact of the 2010 change in corporate diversity policies
In 2010, the ECB’s Executive Board issued a public statement on diversity and announced
a package of measures to support gender balance, to be implemented in subsequent years.
Figure 4 shows that this change in diversity policies had material effects on gender dif-
ferences in promotion outcomes: the gender gap in promotions, defined as the difference
in the promotion rates of men and women, narrowed from 2011 onwards. While prior to
2011, the gender promotion gap stood at over 36% after ten years since entry, this gap
decreased to about 8% on average after 2011, or a decline of about 80 percent. We next
assess more formally the impact of the 2010 change in diversity policies on the gender pro-
motion gap. We follow two empirical strategies. First, we extend model (2) by allowing
the female dummy coefficient to change after 2011 by including an interaction between
the Female dummy variable and a dummy variable that takes value of one for post-2011
observations. The results are presented in Table 7. These regressions confirm that after
2011 women are as likely to be promoted as men (column (1)). While prior to 2011, the
promotion rate of women was 0.28% lower than for men, after 2011 women had closed
this gap. We also find that promotion rates decreases on average after 2011, possibly the
low attrition rates made it increasingly difficult to get promoted. In columns (3) and (4)
we split the sample based on whether the employee has dependent children or not. We
find that promotion rates tend to be substantially lower for women with children. While
for women without children, the promotion gap closes after 2011, this is not the case for
women with children.
Second, we split the sample into two time subperiods: before and after 2011. These
results are presented in tables A.3 and A.4. The difference between these two tables is that
in the latter table we split the sample not only between the pre- and post-2011 periods
but also by whether or not the employee has dependent children. Both sets of regression
results confirm that the promotion gender gap disappeared after 2011, although this is
mainly the case for women without children. Women with children continue to face a
gender promotion gap after 2011. This suggests that the diversity policies have had their
intended effects on promotion outcomes of women without children but that these policies
have had no material impact on the promotion gap of women with children.
Our interpretation of the results critically depends on the shift in the promotion gap
to have taken place around 2010 when the ECB announced its corporate diversity policies.
To show that the decrease in the gender promotion gap took place in 2010 and not in
outer years, we re-estimate model (2) using three-year rolling samples. The estimates of
βP for all possible three-year sample periods are displayed in Appendix Table A.5. These
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results support the interpretation of our main results: we consistently find that the three-
year rolling estimates of βP are negative and statistically significant at the beginning of
9This result is akin to the work by Bertrand et al. (2010) who find that the presence of children is a
key contributor to the gender pay gap.
10This result is similar to that of Castilla (2008) who using personnel data from a large service organi-
zation finds evidence of a performance-reward bias, whereby women receive lower salaries than men with
equal ratings on performance evaluations.
the sample until 2010, and that these estimates are no longer statistically significant from
2010 onwards.
5.1.2 The gender promotion gap and individual characteristics
Thus far we have shown that women have a slower career progression prior to the gender
diversity policy change, resulting in lower salary levels. But what are the potential drivers
of this finding? To what extent do individual traits drive this outcome? To this end, we
enrich our empirical specification on promotion outcomes by considering differential effects
along individual characteristics. Specifically, we include interactions between the female
dummy variable and a vector of variables capturing other individual characteristics: an
indicator whether the individual was a top performer in the past two years based on the
annual performance review, an indicator whether the individual received a cash bonus in
the past two years, an indicator whether the individual joined the mentorship program,
and an indicator whether the individual has dependent children. Because we are interested
in the interaction effect and not the level effect of being a woman, these regressions also
include individual fixed effects. This allows us to more precisely estimate the interaction
effects by abstracting from any time-invariant individual characteristics.
The results are presented in Table 8. Column (1) presents results for the full sample
period 2003-2017. In terms of differential effects, we find that women with children are
less likely to be promoted, consistent with the results in A.4. Next we split the sample
in the period before and after the policy change. The results are presented in columns
(2) and (3). We find that women with dependent children are less likely to be promoted
prior to 2011, consistent with supply side explanations associated with the presence of
children.9 We also find that women that received a bonus are less likely to be promoted
prior to 2011. This is consistent with the notion of a performance-reward bias whereby
bonuses are used as a consolation prize for not being promoted.10 Both the performance-
reward bias and the effect of dependent children disappears in the period following the
policy change. Indeed, following this change we no longer find a differential effect for
women along any of the individual characteristics considered.
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11We consider as potential candidates everyone in the sample that belongs to salary band F/G. Alter-
natively we consider a stricter definition, requiring potential candidates to also be in the same directorate
as the campaign, and results are qualitatively very similar. Results are available upon request.
12The sample only includes a handful of promotions to salary band I and does not cover promotions
to salary bands above I.
13In some specifications, we control for the fraction of external applicants in each campaign to account
for the degree of external competition for jobs.
5.2 Getting promoted: information on recruitment campaigns
(2012-2017)
The lack of a gender gap in promotions after 2011 cannot be interpreted trivially. To
be promoted at the ECB, candidates have to go through a recruitment process and for
that they need to apply first. Failure to detect gender differences in the probability of
promotion can mask gender gaps in the probability of applying and/or the probability
of winning the campaign once being a candidate. The analysis in this section therefore
explores in more depth the selection process by using detailed data on promotion cam-
paigns, which is available from 2012, to determine the underlying driver of the lack of a
promotion gap.
5.2.1 Probability of winning a promotion campaign
Given the information on each recruitment campaign, we define a pool of potential can-
didates among employees in salary band F/G and compute the probability of getting the
promotion to salary band H.11 We only analyze promotions to salary band H.12 We ex-
clude external applications because we miss information on key individual traits for these
candidates.13
We assume a linear model for the probability that a given worker i moves from band
F/G to band H after winning a particular campaign c:
Wic = α
W + βWFemalei + V
′
icγ
W + δWc + 
W
ic (3)
where the dummy Female is equal to 1 for women, Vic is a vector of personal and
family characteristics, worker productivity measures, and job features, δWc are campaign
fixed effects, and Wic is a random error term with unrestricted correlation at the individual
level. Model (3) is estimated among potential candidates, and βW is our coefficient of
interest.
Table 9 reports OLS estimates of the probability of being promoted. All estimations
include campaign, directorate and age dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the
campaign level. Across specifications, we do not find a negative impact of being female
on the probability of winning the campaign. These estimations are indeed consistent with
the results on promotion probabilities after 2011 in tables 7 and A.3.
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If we do not include campaign dummies, we can check the importance of the panel
composition or the share of external candidates. We do not find evidence that the gender
composition of the selection panel influences the campaign outcome (column (6)). We do
find however that the share of external candidates among the candidates has a negative
impact on the probability of being promoted for internal candidates (column (5)), implying
that external competition reduces promotion chances for internal candidates.
As mentioned before, any promotion process implies two stages: first, potential candi-
dates need to apply, hence potential candidates that do not apply have probability zero of
being promoted; and, second, conditional on being a candidate, there is some probability
of getting the offer. Formally, the probability of winning the promotion, W , for any em-
ployee is the product of the probability of actually winning conditional on having applied,
times the probability of applying for the promotion, Pr(W ) = Pr(W |A = 1)× Pr(A).
This has two implications for our empirical analysis. First, the estimation of model
(3) in Table 9 might be biased, if part of the information on the underlying selection
process into the candidates pool is not accounted for. Second, the interpretation and
policy implications of any gender promotion gap, or its absence, would depend on the
underlying probabilities Pr(A) and Pr(W |A = 1).
To address these issues, we first estimate the probability of applying for a promotion
Pr(A), thus exploring a potential gender gap on the selection into the candidates pool.
Then, we estimate the probability of promotion Pr(W ) by using the Heckman (1979)
selection model approach.
5.2.2 Probability of applying
The decision to apply for a promotion campaign depends on the net balance between
the candidate’s cost of applying and the expected rewards from doing so. Apart from
the observable characteristics of the candidate, both the cost and the reward can have
a part that is subjective and difficult to identify, being largely based on the candidate’s
perception of the likelihood of being successful in the campaign. Such perception will be
influenced by personal experience and individual traits, such as preferences for risk-taking
and competition, work-life balance considerations (e.g. raising children), or bargaining
skills that could incidentally affecting the probability of winning the campaign.
We consider a linear model for the probability that the potential candidate i applies
where, as before, the dummy Female is equal to 1 for women, the vector Yic of individ-
ual characteristics includes personal and family characteristics, job features, and worker
for a promotion in campaign c :
Aic = α
A + βAFemalei + Y
′
icγ
A + δAc + 
A
ic (4)
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14Part-time workers predominantly feature women: 29% of female potential candidates work part-time,
versus 7% in the case of male potential candidates.
performance measures, δAc are campaign fixed effects, and 
A
ic is a random error term with
unrestricted correlation at the individual level. Model (4) is estimated among the same
set of potential candidates as model (3), and βA is our coefficient of interest.
Table 10 presents the main results. All the specifications include campaign fixed effects
and we consider personal and family characteristics, job features, and worker performance
measures. We find that women are less likely to apply than men to an open vacancy.
The raw gender gap for campaign applications is around 1% and statistically signif-
icant. This gap remains broadly unchanged after controlling for individual and family
characteristics, varying from 1.2% to 1.6% depending on the regression specification. The
magnitude of this gap is substantially large, given that the average application rate in our
sample of potential candidates is 3.8%.
Characteristics such as tenure within band, having received positive feedback from the
direct boss in the last two years (in the form of being recognized as a top performer in
the annual appraisals, and/or obtaining a bonus) significantly increases the likelihood of
applying for a promotion. Results in Table 10 are also supportive of supply-side expla-
nations for the existence of gender differences in promotion outcomes. Consistent with
such explanations, we find a positive effect of joining the ECB mentorship program. On
the contrary, having children or working part-time are both negatively associated with
applying for promotion, suggesting that work-life balance considerations partly drive the
decision to seek a promotion.14 Promotions generally come with more responsibilities that
may be more difficult to combine with aspirations to raise a family.
5.2.3 Probability of winning a campaign accounting for the probability of
applying
Next, we model the probability of winning a selection campaign as before, except that we
account for the fact that only people who applied for a vacancy have a positive probability
of winning the campaign. That is, the latent probability of winning a campaign, W ∗:
Aic = α
A + βAFemalei + Y
′
icγ
A + δAc + 
A
ic > 0 (6)
W ∗ic = α










is only observed (that is Wic = W
∗
ic) if the probability of applying is different from
zero:
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Variables and parameters definitions are as in models (3) and (4) above. Model as-
sumptions for the error terms in equations (5) and (6) are that:
W
∗
ic ∼ N(0, σ)






Equation (5) is known as the outcome equation and equation (6) as the selection
equation.
Identification requires some exclusion restriction, namely some variable that drives the
selection into the applicants pool which is not a determinant of the probability of wining
the campaign (the outcome equation). In our case, we consider indicators of whether the
worker is head of household, whether she has children, and whether she has worked part-
time any period during the last two years as valid selection variables. All three variables
are expected to influence the decision to apply for promotion but they are not supposed
to influence the promotion decisions because the selection panels do not have access to
such information (campaign folders do not include information on marital status, children,
household income, or leave).
Table 11 shows estimations of the probability of being promoted using the two-step
Heckman model. The outcome equation has a linear specification, while the selection
equation is a probit. Similarly to what we obtained before (table 9 and the results after
2011 in tables 7 and A.3), our estimates indicate that from 2012 onwards women are as
likely to be promoted as men.
Our finding of no gender gap in the probability of promotion, Pr(W ), combined with
a negative gap in the probability of applying, Pr(A), suggests that there is a positive
gap in the probability of being promoted conditional on having applied Pr(W |A = 1), as
Pr(W ) = Pr(W |A = 1) × Pr(A). To assess this more formally, we estimate model (3)
for the subsample of actual candidates (i.e., applicants), and obtain the results reported
in Table 12. Conditional on having applied, women have indeed a higher probability of
winning the campaign relative to men. The effect is substantial: following application,
the probability of promotion is 7% higher for women than for men. This is a large effect
compared to the average probability of promotion among applicants of 8%.
Taken together, these results imply that after 2011 women appear as likely as men to
be promoted. This result is, however, masking a lower probability of women to apply for
promotions, and a higher probability to win the campaign conditional on applying.
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5.2.4 Wage progression following promotion
We find that, conditional on applying, women have a higher probability to win a campaign.
Is this due to positive discrimination of female candidates or does the application filter
select into better suited female than male candidates? To distinguish between these
alternative applications, we analyze the wage progression of candidates after they get
promoted. Specifically, we estimate a linear regression model of log salary steps and
include interaction terms between the Female and Salary band H (and I) dummy variables.
A positive coefficient on these interaction terms indicates that women have a more rapid
wage progression upon promotion. For these regressions we turn again to our main dataset
covering the period 2003-2017. The results are presented in Table 13. The results in
column (1) are for the entire sample period. We find that after promotion women perform
better than men in terms of salaries, suggesting that the higher probability to be promoted
is based on merit, not discrimination.
The critic could argue that the ECB’s gender policy change favors women, and that
as a result women get promoted no matter what and thus their compensation rises subse-
quently independent of fundamentals. If this were true, then we should see that the salary
progression of women if anything is stronger after the policy change in 2010. However,
when we split the sample in the period before and after the policy change in 2010 we
find that the results if anything is stronger before than after 2011 (columns (2) and (3)
respectively).
Does this mean that women make up much of the lost income prior to promotion
following promotion? No. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the salary path of men and
women after entering at the F/G level, and is based on the estimates in column (1) of
Table 13, when evaluated at the mean for all the covariates except female, tenure and
the salary band that are allowed to change. The right-hand side panel of Figure 5 shows
the evolution of salaries for (average) men and women in salary band F/G as tenure
progresses, setting the time it takes to be promoted to H band at six years for men and
nine for women, which is the average tenure in band F/G before promotion observed in
our sample over the time span 2003-2017. While women close much of the salary gap
with men after they get promoted, their accumulated income is still substantially lower
due to lost income over the years prior to promotion. The left-hand side panel of Figure
5 shows the evolution of salaries for men and women, based on the estimates in Table
13, after setting the expected time it takes to be promoted for women equal to that for
men, namely 6 years. This shows that if women were as likely to apply for promotion
opportunities as men, men and women would enjoy the same salaries by year six upon
entry in F/G and that much of the accumulated gender pay gap would disappear.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 28 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1915
Taken together, this implies that while the promotion gap disappears following the
policy change, the career paths of women that joined prior to the policy change do not
fully catch up with those of men because of the lost ground prior to the policy change.
6 Conclusions
We have studied gender differences in career progress and promotions at the ECB using
confidential anonymized personnel data from its professional staff over the period 2003
to 2017. A wage gap emerges between men and women within a few years of hiring,
despite roughly similar entry conditions in terms of salary levels and other observables.
In addition women are less likely to be promoted to higher salary bands before 2011. In
the period after 2011, when the ECB announced a series of gender diversity policies, this
gap is no longer significant. A more detailed analysis from 2012, using data on recruitment
campaigns shows that women are less likely to apply for promotions, but conditional on
applying, women are more likely to win the campaign. The latter does not appear to
be due to positive discrimination, because following promotion women perform better in
terms of wage progression than men. Overall, while women are able to close the wage gap
with men following promotion, their lifetime income still suffers given the longer time it
takes to get promoted. The gender promotion gap is particularly pronounced for women
with children.
Taken together these results suggest that institutional efforts to boost the fraction
of women in the ranks of male-dominated organizations should include measures aimed
at lowering the barriers for women to seek and apply for promotion opportunities. Such
measures could range from establishing mentoring programs and female networks to offer-
ing assertiveness and interview trainings to enhanced child support benefits and services.
Understanding the main drivers of the observed gender promotion gap is critically impor-
tant to improve our understanding of how we can close the gender gap and ensure that
women are adequately represented.
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Notes: Left-panel: average step levels by gender since entry in F/G for all the employees in our sample.
Right-panel: average step levels by gender since entry in F/G for those employees who stay in salary band
F/G.
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Notes: Left-panel: average step levels by gender since entry in F/G for employees with dependent children.
Right-panel: average step levels by gender since entry in F/G for employees without dependent children.
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Notes: Average annual probability of promotion (moving from salary band F/G to H or I) by gender since
entry in F/G for all the employees in our sample.
Figure 4: Gender gap in the probability of promotion from salary band F/G, % (before
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Notes: Gender gap on the average annual probability of promotion (moving from salary band F/G to H
or I) since entry in F/G before 2011 and from 2011 onwards.
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Notes: The graphs report predicted wage profiles from estimates in column (1) of Table 13, when evaluated
at the mean for all the covariates except female, tenure and the salary band, which are allowed to vary.
Left-panel: predicted average wage (step levels) by gender since entry in salary band F/G if both, males
and females, are promoted to salary band H after six years in band F/G. Right-panel: predicted average
wage (step levels) by gender since entry in salary band F/G if males are promoted after six years and
females after nine.
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Table 1: ECB salary structure in steps
A B C D E E/F F/G G H I
1 1 33 75 132 194 194 263 333 419 454
2 2 34 76 133 195 195 264 334 420 455
3 3 35 77 134 196 196 265 335 421 456
4 4 36 78 135 197 197 266 336 422 457
· · ·
55 55 87 129 186 248 248 317 387 473 508
56 88 130 187 249 249 318 388 474 509
· · ·
73 105 147 204 266 266 335 405 491 526
74 148 205 267 267 336 406 492 527
· · ·
89 163 220 282 282 351 421 507 542
90 221 283 283 352 422 508 543
91 284 284 353 423 509 544
92 285 285 354 424
· · ·
98 291 291 360 430






Notes: Equal steps denote equal salaries across bands. Each step is 0.25% higher
than the previous one. Salaries are reviewed annually based on each employee’s
personal development and contribution to the performance of the ECB. According
to that review, each employee is granted a number of steps. Figures in bold denote
those included in the analysis.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Total [1] Male [2] Female Diff. [1]-[2]
Dataset 1: Working histories 2003-2017
Observations n, % 85,516 68.65% 31.35%
Workers n, % 1,084 68.36% 31.64%
Observations in salary band F/G n, % 58,544 64.17% 35.83%
Observations in salary band H n, % 17,685 75.81% 24.19%
Observations in salary band I n, % 9,287 83.21% 16.79%
Age mean 39.66 40.01 38.89 1.12***
Salary steps mean 374.11 381.94 356.98 24.96***
Salary steps in F/G mean 333.67 335.65 330.14 5.51***
Tenure within band mean 5.12 5.08 5.22 -0.14***
Children (yes=1) mean 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.00
Number of children mean 1.91 1.96 1.81 0.15***
Permanent promotion % 0.43% 0.47% 0.34% 0.13%**
Individuals with temporary promotions % 8.11% 8.12% 8.11% 0.01%
Top performer (yes=1) mean 0.54 0.51 0.58 -0.07***
Bonus (yes=1) mean 0.27 0.27 0.28 -0.01***
Mentee (yes=1) mean 0.03 0.01 0.06 -0.04***
Before 2011:
Permanent promotion % 0.40% 0.49% 0.22% 0.28%***
Top performer (yes=1) mean 0.57 0.56 0.59 -0.03***
Bonus (yes=1) mean 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.01**
Mentee (yes=1) mean - - - -
From 2011:
Permanent promotion % 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.00%
Top performer (yes=1) mean 0.51 0.47 0.57 -0.10***
Bonus (yes=1) mean 0.41 0.40 0.42 -0.03***
Mentee (yes=1) mean 0.05 0.02 0.10 -0.08***
Dataset 2: Promotion campaigns 2012-2017
Observations (potential candidates) n, % 23,259 64.12% 35.88%
Observations (applicants) n, % 810 70.37% 29.63%
Observations (winners) n, % 62 53.23% 46.77%
Probability of winning (applicants) mean (%) 7.65% 5.79% 12.08% -6.30***
Probability of winning (potential candidates) mean (%) 0.27% 0.22% 0.35% -0.13%*
Applicants:
Tenure within band mean 7.46 7.16 8.16 -1.00***
Top performer (yes=1) mean 0.64 0.60 0.72 -0.12***
Bonus (yes=1) mean 0.52 0.49 0.57 -0.08**
Mentee (yes=1) mean 0.11 0.05 0.25 -0.20***
Part-time (yes=1) mean 0.09 0.04 0.23 -0.20***
Head of household (yes=1) mean 0.38 0.42 0.30 0.12***
Children (yes=1) mean 0.50 0.44 0.63 -0.19***
Maternity leave (yes=1) mean 0.06 0.00 0.21 -0.21***
Potential candidates:
Tenure within band mean 6.29 6.03 6.75 -0.73***
Top performer (yes=1) mean 0.50 0.45 0.57 -0.12***
Bonus (yes=1) mean 0.39 0.37 0.42 -0.04***
Mentee (yes=1) mean 0.06 0.03 0.12 -0.09***
Part-time (yes=1) mean 0.15 0.07 0.29 -0.22***
Head of household (yes=1) mean 0.32 0.38 0.21 0.17***
Children (yes=1) mean 0.48 0.45 0.54 -0.09***
Maternity leave (yes=1) mean 0.06 0.00 0.16 -0.16***
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Salary band F/G: economist/senior economist;
H: principal economist; I: adviser. Salary steps: salary level in steps. Tenure within band:
years in the current salary band. Children (dummy): 1 if the employee has dependent
children. Permanent [temporary] promotion (d): 1 if employee [temporarily] moves to a
higher salary band. Top performer (d): 1 if employee’s salary award is among the top
25% in her business area at least once in the last 2 years. Bonus (d): 1 if employee
received cash bonuses in the last 2 years. Mentee (d): 1 if employee participated in the
mentorship program in the last 2 years. Part-time (d): 1 if employee worked part-time
in the last 2 years. Head of household (d): 1 if the spouse earns less than a certain level
(currently e 57,211) or if single parent.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics at entry into the ECB (2003-2017)
Total [1] Male [2] Female Diff. [1]-[2]
Workers who enter in salary band F/G n, % 598 68.73% 31.27%
Age mean 33.24 33.59 32.49 1.10**
Salary steps mean 308.42 309.73 305.56 4.17
Children (yes=1) mean 0.21 0.25 0.14 0.11***
Number of children mean 1.66 1.70 1.50 0.20
At entry to the ECB (2003-2007):
Workers who enter in salary band F/G n, % 176 67.61% 32.39%
Age mean 31.73 32.06 31.05 1.01
Salary steps mean 327.83 329.74 323.84 5.90
Children (yes=1) mean 0.17 0.21 0.09 0.12**
Number of children mean 1.50 1.52 1.40 0.12
At entry to the ECB (2008-2012):
Workers who enter in salary band F/G n, % 168 61.31% 38.69%
Age mean 33.36 33.50 33.15 0.34
Salary steps mean 299.58 300.37 298.32 2.05
Children (yes=1) mean 0.18 0.22 0.12 0.10
Number of children mean 1.58 1.65 1.38 0.28
At entry to the ECB (2013-2017):
Workers who enter in salary band F/G n, % 254 74.41% 25.59%
Age mean 34.21 34.60 33.08 1.53*
Salary steps mean 300.83 302.23 296.77 -5.46
Children (yes=1) mean 0.26 0.29 0.20 0.09
Number of children mean 1.76 1.80 1.62 0.18
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Salary band F/G: economist/senior economist. Salary
steps: salary level in steps. Children (dummy): 1 if the employee has dependent children.
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Table 5: Linear regression of logwages: Subsamples
Within band F/G
(1) No child (2) Children (3) No child (4) Children
Female -0.007 -0.016∗∗ -0.010 -0.021∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Tenure within band 0.013∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Salary band H 0.285∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.007)
Salary band I 0.370∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.009)
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38024 47492 31279 27265
R2 0.838 0.859 0.635 0.614
Notes: Linear regression, monthly data 2003-2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clus-
tered by individual. Directorate and time dummies included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Sample includes salary band F/G: economist/senior economist, H: principal economist, and I:
adviser. Dependent variable: log of wages (measured as salary steps). Female (dummy): 1 if
the employee is a woman. Tenure within band: years in the current salary band. Salary band H
[I] (d): 1 if the employee is in salary band H [I]. Age dummies: 1 if the age of the employee is
within a interval, namely (. , 35), [35 , 40), [40, 45), [45 , 50), [50 ,55), [55,. ).
Table 4: Linear regression of logwages: Baseline
Within band F/G
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.013∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)
Tenure within band 0.019∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Salary band H 0.314∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
Salary band I 0.415∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008)
Age dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 85516 85516 85516 85516 58544 58544
R2 0.822 0.866 0.122 0.511 0.504 0.643
Notes: Linear regression, monthly data 2003-2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
individual. Directorate and time dummies included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sample includes
salary band F/G: economist/senior economist, H: principal economist, and I: adviser. Dependent
variable: log of wages (measured as salary steps). Female (dummy): 1 if the employee is a woman.
Tenure within band: years in the current salary band. Salary band H [I] (d): 1 if the employee is in
salary band H [I]. Age dummies: 1 if the age of the employee is within a interval, namely (. , 35), [35
, 40), [40, 45), [45 , 50), [50 ,55), [55,. ).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 39 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1915
Table 6: Linear regression of the probability of promotion: Baseline
(1) (2) (3) No child (4) Children
Female -0.0014∗∗∗ -0.0018∗∗∗ -0.0009 -0.0029∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0009)
Tenure within band 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Temporary promotion 0.0012 0.0002 0.0016 -0.0012
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Top performer 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0009)
Bonus 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Mentee 0.0036 0.0039 0.0035
(0.0027) (0.0042) (0.0034)
Observations 59356 59356 31590 27766
R2 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006
Notes: Linear regression, monthly data 2003-2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered by individual. Directorate, time and age dummies included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. Dependent variable: Permanent promotion (dummy), takes value 1 if employee
moves to a higher salary band. Female (d): 1 if the employee is a woman. Tenure within
band: years in the current salary band. Temporary promotion (d), takes value 1 if employee
has ever moved to a higher salary band for a limited time. Top performer (d): 1 if employee’s
salary award is among the top 25% in her business area at least once in the last 2 years.
Bonus (d): 1 if employee received cash bonuses in the last 2 years. Mentee (d): 1 if employee
participated in the mentorship program in the last 2 years. Children (d): if the employee has
dependent children.
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Table 7: Linear regression of the probability of promotion: Policy change
(1) (2) (3) No child (4) Children
Female -0.0028∗∗∗ -0.0028∗∗∗ -0.0016∗∗ -0.0042∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0012)
Tenure within band 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Temporary promotion 0.0012 0.0003 0.0017 -0.0011
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Post-2010 -0.0064∗∗∗ -0.0066∗∗∗ 0.0008 -0.0097∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0035)
Female x Post-2010 0.0025∗∗ 0.0019∗ 0.0013 0.0023
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0017)
Top performer 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0009)
Bonus 0.0031∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Mentee 0.0033 0.0037 0.0031
(0.0027) (0.0042) (0.0035)
Observations 59356 59356 31590 27766
R2 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006
Notes: Linear regression, monthly data 2003-2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered by individual. Directorate, time and age dummies included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. Dependent variable: Permanent promotion (dummy), takes value 1 if employee
moves to a higher salary band. Female (d): 1 if the employee is a woman. Tenure within
band: years in the current salary band. Temporary promotion (d), takes value 1 if employee
has ever moved to a higher salary band for a limited time. Top performer (d): 1 if employee’s
salary award is among the top 25% in her business area at least once in the last 2 years.
Bonus (d): 1 if employee received cash bonuses in the last 2 years. Mentee (d): 1 if employee
participated in the mentorship program in the last 2 years. Children (d): if the employee has
dependent children. Post-2010 (d): takes value 1 for years 2011 to 2017.
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Table 8: Linear regression of the probability of promotion: Differential effects
(1) (2) Before 2011 (3) From 2011
Tenure within band 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 0.0011***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Top performer 0.0043*** 0.0041*** 0.0021
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0015)
Female x Top performer -0.0020 -0.0020 0.0003
(0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0024)
Bonus 0.0043*** 0.0055* 0.0026
(0.0013) (0.0031) (0.0016)




Female x Mentee 0.0079 0.0039
(0.0059) (0.0070)
Children 0.0037* 0.0044 0.0024
(0.0021) (0.0032) (0.0035)
Female x Children -0.0053** -0.0067* -0.0056
(0.0025) (0.0039) (0.0045)
Observations 59356 27500 31856
R2 0.007 0.008 0.007
Notes: Linear regression, monthly data 2003-2017. All regressions include individual fixed ef-
fects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. Directorate, time and age
dummies included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable: Permanent promo-
tion (dummy), takes value 1 if employee moves to a higher salary band. Tenure within band:
years in the current salary band. Top performer (d): 1 if employee’s salary award is among the
top 25% in her business area at least once in the last 2 years. Bonus (d): 1 if employee re-
ceived cash bonuses in the last 2 years. Mentee (d): 1 if employee participated in the mentorship
program in the last 2 years. Children (d): if the employee has dependent children.
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Table 9: Linear regression of the probability of promotion: Campaigns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.0011 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Tenure within band 0.0003∗∗ 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Top performer 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Bonus 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Mentee 0.0057∗∗ 0.0057∗∗ 0.0057∗∗ 0.0057∗∗ 0.0057∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025)
Part-time -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)




Share of external candidates -0.0107∗ -0.0109
(0.0054) (0.0080)
Size of selection panel -0.0001
(0.0003)
Share of female panelists -0.0001
(0.0023)
Observations 23259 23259 23259 23259 23259 23259
R2 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003
Notes: Linear regression, campaigns data 2012-2017. The sample includes potential candidates to re-
cruitment campaigns. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by campaign. Directorate and age
dummies included. Campaign dummies also included except in (5) and (6). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. Dependent variable: dummy variable that takes value 1 if the employee is offered the promotion
after a recruitment campaign. Female (d): 1 if the employee is a woman. Tenure within band: years in
the current salary band. Top performer (d): 1 if employee’s salary award is among the top 25% in her
business area at least once in the last 2 years. Bonus (d): 1 if employee received cash bonuses in the last
2 years. Mentee (d): 1 if employee participated in the mentorship program in the last 2 years. Part-time
(d): 1 if employee worked part-time in the last 2 years. Head of household (d): 1 if the spouse earns
less than a certain level (currently e 57,211) or if single parent. Children (d): 1 if the employee has
dependent children. Share of external candidates: the ratio of external over total number of candidates
to a particular selection campaign. Size selection panel: number of members of the campaign’s selection
panel. Share of female panelists: number of female panel members over total number of panel members.
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Table 10: Linear regression of the probability of applying for promotion: Campaigns
(1) (2) (3)
Female -0.0159∗∗∗ -0.0126∗∗∗ -0.0142∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0027)
Tenure within band 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Top performer 0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0119∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Bonus 0.0099∗∗∗ 0.0094∗∗∗ 0.0096∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031)








Observations 23259 23259 23259
R2 0.023 0.024 0.023
Notes: Linear regression, campaigns data 2012-2017. The sample
includes potential candidates to recruitment campaigns. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses, clustered by campaign. Campaign, direc-
torate and age dummies included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Dependent variable: dummy variable that takes value 1 if the em-
ployee applies for a promotion (thus participates in a recruitment
campaign). Female (d): 1 if the employee is a woman. Tenure
within band: years in the current salary band. Top performer (d): 1
if employee’s salary award is among the top 25% in her business area
at least once in the last 2 years. Bonus (d): 1 if employee received
cash bonuses in the last 2 years. Mentee (d): 1 if employee partici-
pated in the mentorship program in the last 2 years. Part-time (d):
1 if employee worked part-time in the last 2 years. Head of house-
hold (d): 1 if the spouse earns less than a certain level (currently
e 57,211) or if single parent. Children (d): 1 if the employee has
dependent children.
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Table 11: Linear regression of the probability of promotion: Heckman
Received the offer: (1) (2) (3)
Female 0.0220 0.0427 0.0284
(0.0424) (0.0585) (0.0394)
Tenure within band 0.0045 0.0024 0.0039
(0.0047) (0.0061) (0.0044)
Top performer 0.0671∗ 0.0510 0.0619∗
(0.0348) (0.0451) (0.0323)
Bonus 0.0565∗∗ 0.0456 0.0530∗∗
(0.0277) (0.0354) (0.0261)
Mentee 0.0896∗ 0.0664 0.0827∗
(0.0525) (0.0717) (0.0497)
Applying (Probit):
Female -0.1841∗∗∗ -0.2086∗∗∗ -0.1700∗∗∗
(0.0391) (0.0388) (0.0399)
Tenure within band 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0221∗∗∗ 0.0232∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049)
Top performer 0.1677∗∗∗ 0.1748∗∗∗ 0.1675∗∗∗
(0.0360) (0.0359) (0.0360)
Bonus 0.1233∗∗∗ 0.1247∗∗∗ 0.1196∗∗∗
(0.0355) (0.0355) (0.0356)








λ 0.1359 0.0301 0.1041
(0.1836) (0.2736) (0.1670)
Observations 23259 23259 23259
Notes: Linear regression (Received the offer) and Probit regression (Applying),
campaigns data 2012-2017. The sample includes potential candidates to recruit-
ment campaigns. Standard errors in parentheses. Campaign, directorate and
age dummies included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable
(Received the offer): dummy that takes value 1 if the employee is offered the
promotion. Dependent variable (Applying): dummy that takes value 1 if the
employee applies for a promotion. Female (d): 1 if the employee is a woman.
Tenure within band: years in the current salary band. Top performer (d): 1
if employee’s salary award is among the top 25% in her business area at least
once in the last 2 years. Bonus (d): 1 if employee received cash bonuses in the
last 2 years. Mentee (d): 1 if employee participated in the mentorship program
in the last 2 years. Part-time (d): 1 if employee worked part-time in the last
2 years. Head of household (d): 1 if the spouse earns less than a certain level
(currently e 57,211) or if single parent. Children (d): 1 if the employee has
dependent children.
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Table 12: Linear regression of the probability of promotion, conditional on having applied
for promotion: Campaigns
(1) (2) (3)
Female 0.0686∗∗ 0.0487 0.0761∗∗
(0.0294) (0.0292) (0.0300)
Tenure within band 0.0027 0.0018 0.0016
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027)








Observations 810 810 810
R2 0.081 0.099 0.108
Notes: Linear regression, campaigns data 2012-2017. The sample
includes actual candidates who applied to recruitment campaigns.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by campaign. Cam-
paign, directorate and age dummies included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. Dependent variable: dummy that takes value 1 if the
candidate is offered the promotion. Female (d): 1 if the employee
is a woman. Tenure within band: years in the current salary band.
Top performer (d): 1 if employee’s salary award is among the top
25% in her business area at least once in the last 2 years. Bonus
(d): 1 if employee received cash bonuses in the last 2 years. Mentee
(d): 1 if employee participated in the mentorship program in the last
2 years. Maternity leave (d): 1 if candidate is on maternity leave in
the last 2 years.
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Table 13: Linear regression of logwages: Wage gap following promotion
(1) (2) Before 2011 (3) From 2011
Female -0.017∗∗ -0.016∗ -0.016∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Tenure within band 0.012∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Salary band H 0.259∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Salary band I 0.350∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.008)
Female x Salary band H 0.028∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.018∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Female x Salary band I 0.017 0.005 0.014
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Observations 85516 37118 48398
R2 0.867 0.820 0.899
Notes: Linear regression, monthly data 2003-2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered by individual. Age, directorate and time dummies included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. Sample includes salary band F/G: economist/senior economist, H: principal
economist, and I: adviser. Dependent variable: log of wages (measured as salary steps).
Female (dummy): 1 if the employee is a woman. Tenure within band: years in the current
salary band. Salary band H [I] (d): 1 if the employee is in salary band H [I]. Age dummies:
1 if the age of the employee is within a interval, namely (. , 35), [35 , 40), [40, 45), [45
, 50), [50 ,55), [55,. ).
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A Appendix tables
Table A.1: Linear regression of logwages: OLS vs FE
Within band F/G
(1) OLS (2) FE (3) OLS (4) FE (5) OLS (6) FE
Female -0.011∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.006)
Tenure within band 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Salary band H 0.266∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.010)
Salary band I 0.353∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.014)
Observations 85516 85516 85516 85516 58544 58544
Individuals 1084 1084 1084 1084 1024 1024
Adjusted R2 0.866 0.871 0.510 0.748 0.642 0.779
Notes: Linear regression, monthly data 2003-2017. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Panel Fixed
Effects Estimates with individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by indi-
vidual. Directorate, age and time dummies included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sample includes
salary band F/G: economist/senior economist, H: principal economist, and I: adviser. Dependent vari-
able: log of wages (measured as salary steps). Female (dummy): 1 if the employee is a woman. Tenure
within band: years in the current salary band. Salary band H [I] (d): 1 if the employee is in salary band
H [I].
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Table A.2: Linear regression of logwages: Number and ages of children
Within band F/G
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.013∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Tenure within band 0.018∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
One child 0.019∗∗ 0.002 0.036∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010)
Two children 0.032∗∗∗ 0.014 0.064∗∗∗ 0.034∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.018)
Three or more children 0.033∗∗ 0.015 0.076∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗
(0.016) (0.013) (0.023) (0.019)
Children younger than 1 -0.015∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.031∗∗∗ -0.008
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008)
Children between 1 and 3 -0.010∗ -0.001 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.010
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008)
Children between 3 and 6 -0.003 0.001 -0.019∗∗ -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008)
Children older than 6 0.013∗ 0.003 0.013 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011)
Salary band H 0.301∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
Salary band I 0.400∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008)
Age dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 85516 85516 58544 58544
R2 0.829 0.867 0.537 0.650
Notes: Linear regression, monthly data 2003-2017. Robust standard errors
in parentheses, clustered by individual. Directorate and time dummies in-
cluded. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sample includes salary band F/G:
economist/senior economist, H: principal economist, and I: adviser. Dependent
variable: log of wages (measured as salary steps). Female (dummy): 1 if the
employee is a woman. Tenure within band: years in the current salary band.
Salary band H [I] (d): 1 if the employee is in salary band H [I]. Age dummies:
1 if the age of the employee is within a interval, namely (. , 35), [35 , 40),
[40, 45), [45 , 50), [50 ,55), [55,. ). Number and ages of children are dummy
variables.
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Table A.3: Linear regression of the probability of promotion: Before and after 2011
(1) Before 2011 (2) From 2011 (3) Before 2011 (4) From 2011
Female -0.0025∗∗∗ -0.0004 -0.0025∗∗∗ -0.0011
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Tenure within band 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Temporary promotion -0.0011 0.0043∗∗∗ -0.0016∗ 0.0026∗
(0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0015)






Observations 27500 31856 27500 31856
R2 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005
Notes: Linear regression, monthly data 2003-2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
individual. Directorate, time and age dummies included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent
variable: Permanent promotion (dummy), takes value 1 if employee moves to a higher salary band.
Female (d): 1 if the employee is a woman. Tenure within band: years in the current salary band.
Temporary promotion (d), takes value 1 if employee has ever moved to a higher salary band for a
limited time. Top performer (d): 1 if employee’s salary award is among the top 25% in her business
area at least once in the last 2 years. Bonus (d): 1 if employee received cash bonuses in the last 2 years.
Mentee (d): 1 if employee participated in the mentorship program in the last 2 years. Children (d): if
the employee has dependent children.
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Table A.4: Linear regression of the probability of promotion: Before and after 2011 &
Presence of children
No child Children
(1) Before 2011 (2) From 2011 (3) Before 2011 (4) From 2011
Female -0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0046∗∗ -0.0054∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0022) (0.0020)
Tenure within band 0.0005∗∗ 0.0003∗∗ 0.0003 0.0009∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Temporary promotion -0.0008 0.0065∗∗ -0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0048∗
(0.0012) (0.0029) (0.0020) (0.0029)
Top performer 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0018∗ 0.0046∗ 0.0046∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0024) (0.0021)
Bonus 0.0013 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0041 0.0009
(0.0024) (0.0012) (0.0041) (0.0019)
Mentee 0.0034 0.0084
(0.0041) (0.0052)
Observations 15174 16416 4925 5823
R2 0.004 0.006 0.014 0.010
Notes: Linear regression, monthly data 2003-2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
individual. Directorate, time and age dummies included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent
variable: Permanent promotion (dummy), takes value 1 if employee moves to a higher salary band.
Female (d): 1 if the employee is a woman. Tenure within band: years in the current salary band.
Temporary promotion (d), takes value 1 if employee has ever moved to a higher salary band for a
limited time. Top performer (d): 1 if employee’s salary award is among the top 25% in her business
area at least once in the last 2 years. Bonus (d): 1 if employee received cash bonuses in the last 2 years.
Mentee (d): 1 if employee participated in the mentorship program in the last 2 years. Children (d): if
the employee has dependent children.
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Table A.5: Gender promotion gap over time: Three-year rolling estimates













Notes: estimated coefficients of the dummy Fe-
male for same specification as Table 6, column
(2), for three-year rolling samples. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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